The literature on Dutch Social Democracy is, of course, vast and multi-faceted. A comprehensive review is clearly impossible in this short contribution 6 . Rather, I will restrict myself to some critical comments on relatively few works. These are grouped into what I believe continue to be the main areas of historiographie debate, ideology; voting patterns (the quest for the 'doorbraak'); and the party's coalition politics and legislative agenda (post-World War II Reformist Policies). Before embarking on a more specific historiographie review of the history of Dutch Social Democracy, one, perhaps somewhat surprising, characteristic of the literature might be noted. The history of Socialism in The Netherlands has long attracted the attention of scholars outside of Holland, notably those in Germany (here Horst Lademacher at die University of Münster has played a pivotal role) and the AngloSaxon countries. The primary reason for this interest is the vanguard role which the SDAP and the PvdA played in what was to become the general evolutionary pattern of European Socialism. The remarkable language facilities of many Dutch scholars have also helped to generate interest in Dutch political history. A number of Dutch historians and political scientists, writing mostly in English or German, have enabled audiences unable to read Dutch to understand the intricacies of politics in The Netherlands 7 .
Ideology. The Road from Revolution to Evolution
At its founding in 1894 8 the SDAP did not seem destined for playing a unique role in the evolution of European Social Democracy. Borrowing the ideology and organizational patterns of the German SPD, the SDAP seemed destined, like its mentor, to find its political niche as the spokesman for the interests of the nascent industrial proletariat. However, most works on the early SDAP stress quite correctly that the party very rapidly developed a tendency toward pragmatism and the renunciation of violent revolutionary ambitions. A recent article 9 noted,.for example, that even the party's founding program made no mention of the ultimate fall and crisis of capitalism. From the beginning, then, the SDAP's German model was the ideas of Eduard Bernstein rather than Karl Kautsky or Rosa Luxemburg. (Incidentally, this was equally true for the SPD, but as Susanne Miller has pointed out 10 , unlike their Dutch comrades, the 6 M. Brinkman, Honderd jaar sociaal-democratie in boek en lijdschrifi. Bibliografie ... (Amsterdam, 1994 
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German party leaders refused to embrace 'Bernsteinianism' openly, and attempted to straddle the ideological fence between revolution and reformism. The literature suggests at least two important reasons for this ideological development in Dutch Socialism. One was the succession of remarkably level-headed party leaders and ideologues. Two recent biographies of Wiardi Beekman and Henri Polak 11 demonstrate yet again the passionate commitment to political democracy of the early SDAP and labor union leaders. In this context it is not surprising that when the party's leader issued a half-hearted call for revolution in 1918, this was taken more seriously by the later Dutch fascists than by the SDAP's activists. A second factor was fortuitous rather than a virtue on the side of the SDAP. . With most scholars emphasizing the 1930's significance as preparing the way for the smooth road to post-war reformism, it is perhaps useful to note at least one collection of essays which is sharply critical of the Dutch Socialists' ideological evolution in the 1930s and beyond 19 . World War II was a crucial period in the development of European Socialism. Precisely because the Social Democratic parties were out of power and persecuted by the Nazis and their collaborationist allies, they were forced to reexamine many of their ideological postulates, including the role of nationalism and fascism in modern European history. Emerging from the discussion of the Socialists' failure to understand the true nature and threat of fascism 20 were new proposals for the transformation of Democratic Socialism and the Socialist parties in post-war Europe 21 .
Never Keeping the focus of attention on the advance of right-wing reformism has also meant that the remaining pockets of left-wing opposition in the PvdA tend to be rather neglected. This is less true for the 'Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij' (PSP), which split from the party in 1957 27 , than for the 'Sociaal Democratisch Centrum' (SDC), although the latter was for many years a thorn in the side of the PvdA's reformist leaders 28 . The era of somewhat self-satisfied pragmatism turned sour as the 1950s drew to a close. Dissatisfaction with the policies of the bourgeois-PvdA coalition, which had governed The Netherlands throughout the 'long decade of the 1950s', had been growing for some years. The breakup of the coalition was a milestone of sorts; the Dutch Socialists were to spend more than a decade in the opposition. But the end of the decade brought more than a change of seats from the government to the opposition benches for the party. As in much of Europe and, for that matter, the rest of the world, youthful leftist elements challenged the seemingly undoubted verities of the post-war world. The rise of Nieuw Links had some unique features. Like their counterparts in other countries, the Dutch leftists professed a vaguely populist, hyper-democratic, but not really Marxist ideology 29 , but only in The Netherlands did Nieuw Links decide on a Marsch durch die Institutionen, with the PvdA one of the primary, targeted Institutionen. In France the young 'revolutionaries' disregarded the sclerotic Section Françai-se de l'Ouvrière Internationale (SFIO) as irrelevant for the political future of the country, and in Germany the specific nature of the grand coalition led the young Erneuerer to concentrate their efforts on the Ausserparlamentarische Opposition. In The Netherlands, however, for much of the decade of the 1960s Nieuw Links elements fought for control of the party with the 'old guard', and at least on paper by 1969 they had won. The literature on the rise and integration of Nieuw Links also exhibits a strain of historicism. While it is perhaps not surprising that the theoretical contributions of Nieuw Links leaders 30 read as though their authors had just invented the wheel, it is rather more questionable that scholarly contributions favorable to Nieuw Links also insisted the history of the PvdA had just begun with the arrival of the newcomers. In these works the history of the PvdA tended to be treated as a sort of historical mistake until the arrival of Nieuw Links put the party on its correct path 31 . In this atmosphere of heightened emotionalism it is understandable that the critics of Nieuw Links repaid in the same coin. They treated the reformers as the vanguard of the apocalypse, ready to destroy all that was decent in Democratic Socialism A unique component of the PvdA's efforts to become fully accepted as a volkspartij was its attitude toward Dutch colonialism in general and more specifically the Indonesian independence movement. The party's leaders were convinced that only by following the lead of their Catholic coalition partner could they succeed in establishing the PvdA's position as a true mainstream Dutch political party. This decision was not without its contemporary political price, including a loss of members and some bitter personal animosities, notably between the prime minister Willem Drees and the party's parliamentary leader in the early years after the war, Van der Goes van Naters 42 . Some recent analyses are also sharply critical of the PvdA's position as essentially contrary to Socialist ideals of self-determination and human freedom 43 . Still, the controversies over colonialism in the PvdA were mild tensions compared to the upheavals which literally split the French Socialists. The question of Algerian independence led to vituperations of the Socialist leaders, notably Guy Mollet 44 , which have no equivalent in Dutch political literature.
Post World War II Reformist Policies
The PvdA was a member of the governing coalition from 1945 to the end of the 1950s. These years saw the creation of the modern social welfare state in The Netherlands, and the PvdA played a major part in its construction. Indeed, both party leaders and scholars regard this time period as the most successful era in the party's history 45 , although, paradoxically, it is also the least well-studied one. The assessment of the PvdA's reformist policies in terms of success or failure is intricately tied to the debate overthe party's coalition decisions, and that in turn is part of the still on-going debate over the concept of the uiterste noodzaak. The history of Dutch cabinet formations, at least in its structural and institutional parameters, has been well-established 46 , and on the surface the PvdA became an integral part of the Dutch governing elite after World War II. However, a series of publications by H. Daudt in the 1970s and 1980s 47 have called this facile conclusion into question. Daudt contends the Socialists were accepted into the cabinet only when the bourgeois partners felt the PvdA's constituency needed to be pacified by the illusion of sharing power. In effect, the PvdA became a fig leaf for policies that were often contrary to the interests of its core constituency. Whenever the danger of political instability had passed, the Socialists were unceremoniously kicked out of the cabinet. While provocative, Daudt's theory has not been without its critics.
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They contend the bourgeois parties, notably the KVP, did not present nearly as united a front as Daudt claims. Rather, the changes in policy direction and coalition composition were in large part a function of shifts within the Catholic polity 48 .
An example of such a seismic shift within Dutch political Catholicism was the 1954 Catholic bishops' Mandement, a clear effort by the ecclesiastical hierarchy to discourage the left wing drift of the Catholic constituency. The Mandement is often cited as evidence for Daudt's thesis, and the PvdA's decision to appease rather than openly confront the Catholics' challenge as proof that the PvdA failed to recognize the concept of uiterste noodzaak 49. In a sense, the debate over the uiterste noodzaak is a little beside the point, because the PvdA leaders quite deliberately chose to follow a policy of appeasement in regard to the Mandement because they felt remaining in the coalition would bring political benefits to the party. In retrospect, remaining in the coalition for another five years brought a mixed bag of results: Diminishing legislative influence, but increasing success in attracting middle class swing votes to the PvdA. Remarkably, with the exception of the weak left wing, the leaders' decision on remaining part of the coalition and not challenging directly the Mandement was met with relatively little critical comment from within the party or the scholarly community at the time. The flood of analysis and self-criticism did not come until the breakup of the coalition in 1959. Then a number of party leaders 50 contended that the party had stayed in the cabinet far too long. This line was continued by Nieuw Links and its allies, which argued there were very few overeenkomsten between the PvdA and any bourgeois partners, especially the KVP 51. An assessment of the thesis (or perhaps better, accusation) that the PvdA was duped by its coalition partners is not possible without examining the PvdA' s policy objectives in the 1950s and 1960s, and equally important, to place these goals in the context of the larger Dutch political landscape in these years. A number of scholars have noted that the post-war era in The Netherlands (and Western Europe in general) was not a time that favored radical socio-economic innovation. In fact, the climate for democratic social revolution was particularly unfavorable in Holland 52 . In contrast to France, in The Netherlands there was not even the vague de nationalisation 5³ which provided that country with a verisimilitude of radical change. In this sense, then, the PvdA's expressed desire for a radical maatschappelijke omvorming was effectively blocked by the larger political environment. However, as a number of scholars have noted, the PvdA's own historical tradition also put brakes on the party's becoming a vehicle for radical change. Keeping in mind the SDAP's plans for solving the problems of the Great Depression, the PvdA's quiet abandonment of Hein Vos' proposals for fullscale planisme and the party's acceptance of neo-corporatism after World War II are not altogether surprising. It is perhaps symptomatic that the one nationalization scheme that was carried out after World War II, the nationalization of the 'Nederlandsche Bank', was a demand that had already surfaced in the Plan van de Arbeid 54 . Finally, a few remarks on the PvdA's role in Dutch foreign relations. Aside from its continuous activism in the Socialist International, this is a field in which the party over the years has shown less interest and certainly less influence than in domestic affairs 60 
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Liberals and Christian Democrats, not Social Democrats, held the foreign relations portfolio in the post-war cabinets.
Interestingly, with the exception of a not very serious running controversy over the recognition of the former German Democratic Republic in the 1960s, there was (and is) little disagreement on the foreign policy issue in the PvdA. The Netherlands' integration into the Western alliance was accepted as virtually axiomatic, and the party's rank-and-file tended to be even more enthusiastic about European integration than some of the leaders. (Willem Drees, for example, was rather more pessimistic about European political unity than, for example, Sicco Mansholt or Marinus van der Goes van Naters 61 .) Still, the party as a whole accepted with little or no reservation each of the milestones on the road to the European Union from the Schuman Plan and the European Defense Community 62 to the Common Market. Some leaders even pushed early on for the creation of a supra-national European progressive party 63 .
The Future
As a general rule, historians are well advised not to embark on future prognostications, but in the case of the Dutch Socialist party the past history seems to establish such a clear pattern of development, that there is at least a modicum of safety in looking forward. The PvdA and its predecessor played a pioneering role in the self-transformation of European Social Democracy from political groups that represented a single societal constituency to parties that have become genuine left-of-center progressive volkspartijen. This has become the established norm in Western Europe, and is unlikely to change in the future. Moreover, as a pragmatic volkspartij the PvdA has become and continues to be a genuine political success story. It is not insignificant that while the Social Democratic parties in neighboring countries are struggling to attain (or retain) governmental responsibility in the 1990s, the PvdA continues to be a member of the Dutch national coalition. Indeed, a Social Democrat is again the prime minister of The Netherlands. It is precisely for its pioneering role that the PvdA's history has so long fascinated both Dutch and non-Dutch scholars. In a very real sense the history of Dutch Socialism is far more than the story of a single political party in a small country. Rather, the PvdA' s history has achieved typological significance considerably beyond the borders of The Netherlands. True, this development also brought with it a rather historicist emphasis in many of the analyses, but perhaps this is a small price to pay for a particularly rich historiography.
While it is difficult to predict the PvdA's future history, the historian is on somewhat firmer ground in expressing some wishes as to where the future historiography of the party should go. It seems to me that there are three areas that have been rather neglected in recent writings. (Incidentally, these remarks are equally valid for other European Social Democratic parties.)
First of all, analyses of the evolution of ideological developments among Dutch Social Democrats have been rather neglected since the 1950s. After the rush of new ideas from Nieuw Links proved to be neither very new nor much of a set of ideas, all too many historians contented themselves with the notion that the absence of ideology was in fact the Social Democrats' ideology. This is, I think, an unwarranted oversimplification. Post-1970 ideas for the future of Dutch and European society coming from the Social Democrats are clearly not those that were enunciated in the 1930s and 1940s, but they do constitute a specific set of values which differs from those of their political rivals and which do need to be analyzed in more detail.
This needs to be done, I think, in the context of the emerging and by now virtually complete Dutch and West European tertiary industrial society. And this brings me to the second set of desiderata for future historiographie efforts. The traditional Social Democratic ideology was created as an answer to the specific national challenges of a secondary industrial society. Western Europe especially after World War II, however, as a recent book by Hartmut Kaelble has eloquently demonstrated 64 , has become a tertiary industrial society in which national boundaries are becoming increasingly less important. Histories of the PvdA, especially those covering events since the 1970s, should, I think, take more account of this development. Studies of the PvdA in the past have tended to be rather introspective, an emphasis that was perhaps more justified for the period before 1970 than after that date.
Finally, I think, we need more work on the PvdA's role in foreign relations. There is no doubt that for the most part PvdA political leaders were not the movers and shakers in the foreign policy establishment, but it is equally true that many of the ideas which formed the basis for the present-day European Union eminated from the ranks of the Social Democrats and were only belatedly and often grudgingly accepted by the bourgeois political leaders who structured Dutch foreign policy. Historians, I think, would do well to give more credit to the traditions of internationalism among Dutch and other European Social Democrats than they have in the past.
